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One of the most important and delicate of all international relationships,
recognized immemorially as a responsibility of government, has to do with
the protection of the just rights of a country's own nationals when those
nationals are in another country. Experience has shown that international
controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may
arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects inflicted, or
permitted, by a government.'
I. INTRODUCrION
If American citizens are detained or arrested in a foreign country, they should
have the opportunity to speak with an American official.2 This is because the United
States is a party to several international agreements guaranteeing Americans
consular access when they are detained or arrested abroad. Many Americans may
already be aware of this right to consular access, as the right is often memorialized
in the movies as a demand to speak with the American Embassy.4 However, the
right of Americans to speak with their representatives comes with a small price. In
exchange for ensuring American citizens the right to consular assistance abroad, the
United States has agreed to shoulder the responsibility of notifying foreign
nationals of their right to speak with their nations' consular officials when they are
detained or arrested in the United States.5 The problems that arise when trying to
ensure compliance with these international rights by the individual states of the
union are the subject of this Comment.
Four recent death penalty cases involving foreign nationals have alerted the
world that the United States has frequently violated its consular notification duties.6
In April 1998, Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan national, was executed in
Virginia.7 In March 1999, two German nationals, Karl and Walter LaGrand, were
executed in Arizona.8 Finally, in perhaps the most publicized consular notification
1. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941); see id. (discussing the powers of state and federal
governments in the area of regulation of aliens).
2. Cf infra Part I.A-B (discussing the legal basis for consular notification).
3. See infra Part II.A-B (detailing the United States' consular notification obligations).
4. For instance, in the popular recent movie Red Comer, American Jack Moore repeatedly demands to
speak with the American Embassy when he is detained in China. RED CORNER (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1997).
5. See generally infra Part I (discussing the duty of United States officials when a foreign national is
arrested).
6. See infra notes 7-15 and accompanying text (discussing the situations of four recently executed foreign
nationals: Angel Francisco Breard, Karl and Walter LaGrand, and Joseph Stanley Faulder).
7. See Virginia Executes Paraguayan Killer Put to Death Despite Pleas from Albright, World Court,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 15, 1998, at A4, available in 1998 WL 7764387 (reporting Breard's death).
8. See Jerry Nachtigal, LaGrand Dies in State Gas Chamber; Killer Executed Despite Protests from
Germany, ARIz. REPUBuC, Mar. 4, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 4155894 (reporting that Walter LaGrand
died in Arizona's gas chamber one week after his brother, Karl LaGrand, was executed by lethal injection).
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case to date, Joseph Stanley Faulder, a Canadian national, was executed in Texas
on June 17, 1999.9 In each of these cases, the states involved admitted that they had
not advised the foreign nationals of their right to speak with their nations' consular
officers.10 However, preparations for each execution continued, despite pleas from
the United States State Department," the International Court of Justice, 12 and each
accused's nation 13 that the executions be halted while the nationals' consular
notification claims were considered. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to each
national's last-minute appeals.14 This left the ultimate decision-whether to address
an amorphous international law concern, or uphold the validity of state
9. See Bruce Tomaso, Canadian Executed in '75 Killing; His Death Caps Dispute on International
Treaty, DALLAS MORNING NEWs, June 18, 1999, at IA, available in 1999 WL 4128994 (documenting Faulder's
death).
10. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, -U.S.-, 1999 WL 107412 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Arizona officials admitted, only a few days before Walter LaGrand's execution, that they
were aware when LaGrand was arrested that he was a German national); Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 624
(4th Cir. 1998) (stating that Breard had not been notified during his detention and trial of his right to contact the
Paraguayan consulate); Rick Lyman, A Scheduled Execution in Texas Stirs Protest from Canadian Government,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL-NYT 9834101002 (reporting that Faulder was never informed
at the time of his arrest and questioning that he had the right to contact the Canadian Consulate).
11. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,378 (1998) (noting that the United States Secretary of State
sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia requesting a stay of Breard's execution); Paul Koring, Texas Considers
Giving Faulder a 30-day Reprieve; Canadian Ambassador Makes a 'Forceful Appeal', GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto, Can.), Dec. 9, 1998, at Al, available in WESTLAW, 12/09/1998 GLOBEMAIL Al (reporting that the
Secretary of State requested that the Governor of Texas grant Faulder a 30-day reprieve).
12. Paraguay and Germany each brought actions against the United States in the International Court of
Justice based on the Vienna Convention Violations. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Ger. v. U.S.), 38 I.L.M. 308,313 (Mar. 3, 1999) (ordering provisional measures in the LaGrand case);
Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 37 I.L.M. 810, 819 (Apr. 9, 1998)
(setting forth the provisional measures order of the World Court in the Breard case). In both cases, the court issued
provisional measures orders instructing the United States to take measures to ensure that the nationals were not
executed pending the final decisions in the international cases. See Germany, 38 I.L.M. at 313 (ordering that
Walter LaGrand not be executed until the court issued its final order); Paraguay, 3-7 I.L.M. at 819 (ordering that
Angel Francisco Breard not be executed until the court had given its final order). Several months after Breard was
executed, Paraguay dropped its case. See International Court of Justice, Press Comminque' 98/36, (Nov. 11, 1998)
<http://www.icj-cij.org/Presscom/Pressl998ipr9836.htm> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(publishing Paraguay's decision not to go forward with its case against the United States).
13. See generally Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, -U.S.-, 1999 WL 107412, *1 (1999)
(denying Germany's request for an injunction prohibiting the execution of Walter LaGrand); Mark Shaffer,
Germany Fights to Save 2 in Florence; Brothers Face Death in Murder of Banker, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 18,1999,
at Al (discussing German officials' efforts in the LaGrand case); Lyman supra note 10 (reporting Canadian
officials' attempts to prevent Faulder's execution). Paraguay brought claims before the International Court of
Justice and the United States Supreme Court in its attempt to save Breard. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 378-79
(rejecting Paraguay's claims in Breard's case); Virginia Executes Paraguayan Killer Put to Death Despite Pleas
from Albright, World Court, supra note 7 at A4 (reporting that Breard had been executed despite an order of the
International Court of Justice that Breard's execution should be blocked).
14. See Faulder v. Johnson, 119 S. Ct. 2363,2363 (1999) (denying one of Faulder's last-minute petitions
for certiorari); Federal Republic of Germany v. United States,-U.S.-, 1999 WL 107412, *1 (1999) (denying
Germany's last-minute claims on behalf of Walter LaGrand); Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1354-56 (1998)
(denying last-minute claims by Breard, Paraguay, and the Paraguayan Consul).
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sentences-to the governors of each state. Each governor, not surprisingly, upheld
his or her state's laws over the international obligation.'5
The consular notification claims in these death penalty cases are not exceptions.
Rather, they merely publicize an increasing number of legal actions by foreign
nationals who have been detained without consular assistance.16 Although most of
the claims have failed for procedural reasons, they have raised concern in the
international community regarding the United States' intentions not only with
regard to consular notification, but with regard to treaty obligations in general.' 7
The effect of this concern remains to be seen, but given that "[i]nternational law is
founded upon mutuality and reciprocity,"' 8 the potential international backlash
could be dangerous for Americans who are arrested or detained abroad.' 9
Poised against this international dilemma lies the murky area of federalism and
foreign affairs. Under existing case law, the role of the states in the administration
of this nation's international obligations is somewhat unclear. Although a well-
accepted maxim subsists in matters of foreign affairs that "the states do not exist, ' '20
recent decisions of the Supreme Court may have given cause to question the extent
of that "non-existence." These Supreme Court decisions have developed for the
states a structural immunity from federal commandeering of state legislatures or
state executive officials.2 One scholar has suggested that this immunity could
extend to the area of foreign affairs,2 an area in which total federal control over the
treaty process historically has resulted in the individual states being silent partners
to the United States' international agreements.2 If this suggestion is true, the ability
of the United States to meet its international obligations could be jeopardized, as
the states are often left to meet the nation's international obligations.2' Part HI of
15. See infra note 147 and accompanying text (documenting the reactions of the governors of Virginia,
Texas, and Arizona when dealing with the consular notification issues raised by these cases).
16. See infra Part II.C (examining the cases that raise consular notification claims); see generally Mark
Warren, Death Penalty Information Center: Foreign Nationals and the Death Penalty in the United States (last
modified Mar. 31, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/foreignnatl.html> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (compiling a broad array of statistics and information relating to consular notification violations in the
United States).
17. Cf infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text (discussing the international backlash over the United
States' actions in the Vienna Convention cases).
18. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,228 (1895); see Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (1998) (Butzner,
J., concurring) (quoting this phrase from Hilton when discussing the importance of the nation's consular
notification obligations).
19. See infra notes 47-49 (noting the possible repercussions under international law for the material breach
of a treaty).
20. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,331 (1937); see Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CoNsTrruT=oN 150 (2d ed. 1996) (asserting that the states' rights trend in the United States is not
likely to lessen federal control over foreign affairs).
21. See infra Part lll.C (examining the recently developed "commandeering" immunity).
22. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 166-67 (questioning whether the newly devised state immunity would
apply to foreign affairs).
23. Cf HENKIN, supra note 20, at 150-51 (discussing the interaction between states and foreign policy).
24. Id.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
this Comment examines this dilemma, using the federal Consular Notification and
Access Program, which directs state officials to carry out national consular
notification obligations, as the example by which to evaluate the larger question.
This Comment has three goals. The first is to educate the reader on the law
concerning consular notification and access so that the nation's current dilemma is
understood. Thus, Part II of this Comment briefly analyzes the nation's
international consular notification obligations to determine which rights, if any, are
granted to defendants because of those international obligations. Part H also
synthesizes the state and federal cases that have addressed claims brought under the
Convention. The second goal is to discuss an interesting conflict of judicial
reasoning. Part II1 of this Comment explores this conflict by addressing the
question of whether the Supreme Court's newly devised state immunity from
federal commandeering extends to the area of foreign relations. The third goal is a
practical one: to propose a workable compromise solution to the consular
notification problem that would closely comply with the United States'
international duties, without being unconstitutional under existing case law. Thus,
Part IV concludes by offering a method of enforcing the Convention within the
states.
II. THE UNITED STATES' CONSULAR NOTIFICATION OBLIGATIONS
The United States has long recognized the importance of insuring consular
access to Americans detained or arrested in foreign countries. 5 Therefore, the
nation has become a party to the widely followed Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, 26 as well as to several other international agreements which contain
consular access provisions.27 Article 36 of the Vienna Convention sets forth three
rules designed to ensure that consular officers will be able to speak with their fellow
nationals if those nationals are detained or arrested.2' The Convention is considered
25. Cf LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE, 133-45 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing provisions in
consular relations agreements regarding the protection of nationals in the courts of foreign countries, both before
and after the Vienna Convention was enacted).
26. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Aug. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 78 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
27. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 10518, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND AccEss 50-58 (1998)
[hereinafter CONSULAR AccEss PUBLICATION] (providing a reference table of all of the United States' consular
relations agreements).
28. The Convention provides for a right to consular notification, a right to be notified of the right to
notification, and the right of nations to assist their nationals. See infra Part II.B (detailing each of the rights
granted by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention). The text of Article 36 of the Convention provides:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending
State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to
have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with
respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving state shall, without delay,
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federal law and is therefore binding on state and federal officials. 29 However, the
treaty text does not provide a remedy for its violation and, although suppression of
evidence obtained as a result of violations of the Convention has been suggested, 0
no judicial remedy for violation of the Convention currently exists.
This section addresses the United States' consular notification obligations. The
history and significance of consular notification is discussed first, with an emphasis
on the importance the United States has placed on maling sure that American
consular officers have access to Americans who are detained or arrested abroad.
31
Next, this section evaluates the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to
determine what rights it has granted to nations and their citizens.32 Finally, the legal
effect of the treaty obligations is discussed, including a consideration of the
difficulties courts have encountered when addressing claims arising under the
Convention.33
A. Consular Notification-A Nation's Right
The ability of a nation to protect its citizens' interests in foreign countries is a
fundamental precept of consular relations. Nations utilize "consular officers" to
protect the interests of their nationals in foreign countries 4 These officers have a
general duty to protect their fellow nationals residing in or visiting the nation in
inform the consular post of the sending state if, within its consular district, a national of
that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in
any other manner Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person
arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay ofhis
rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in
prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his
legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending state
who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who
is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws
and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under this Article are intended.
Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 36,21 U.S.T. at 100-01 (emphasis added).
29. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-5 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the legal
effect of treaties); infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (outlining the legal status of treaties within the
domestic legal system).
30. Cf infra note 89 and accompanying text (presenting two cases in which suppression of evidence was
suggested by the courts but not utilized).
31. InfraPartlI.A.
32. Infra Part l.B.
33. Infra Part l9.C.
34. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 80 (defining "consular officer"
as "any person... entrusted... with the exercise of consular functions").
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which the consular officer is living.35 Complying with this duty in foreign lands is
made easier because "[a] consul's right to protect his nationals has been recognized
by many publicists and affirmed by the practice of [nations]. 36 Consular officers
protect their fellow citizens in several ways. Consular officers represent a fellow
national's interests when the national is absent from a foreign state in which he or
she has interests, 37 assist nationals with repatriation or in civil actions,38 ensure that
nationals are receiving "judicial equality and fairness, 39 and may even loan money
to a national to get to the airport for a departing flight.'
One of the most important duties of the consular officer is to communicate with
fellow nationals who are detained or arrested.4' This function, in combination with
the consular officers' other duties, gives rise to consular notification provisions in
international agreements.42 The United States has negotiated treaties with consular
notification provisions with nearly every country.4 3 These provisions form the
mechanism which guarantees Americans the right to request consular assistance if
they are ever detained in a foreign country.44
With the benefits of these agreements, however, comes the obligation to see
that other nations' citizens receive similar protections when they are arrested in the
United States.45 The United States State Department addresses this reciprocal duty
in the Department's Consular Access Publication, stating:
These are mutual obligations that also pertain to American citizens abroad.
In general, you should treat a foreign national as you would want an
American citizen to be treated in a similar situation in a foreign country.
This means prompt, courteous notification to the foreign national of the
possibility of consular assistance, and prompt, courteous notification to the
foreign national's nearest consular officials so that they can provide
whatever consular services they deem appropriate.46
35. See LEE, supra note 25, at 124 (listing nations that maintain that a consul is "duty-bound" to accord
protection to his or her fellow citizens).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 127 (citing Mexican Consular instructions).
38. See id. at 126-27 (citing Dominican Consular instructions).
39. See id. at 126 (citing French Consular instructions).
40. See id. at 126 (citing British Consular instructions).
41. See id. at 133 (emphasizing that communication with nationals in prison is a "major protective
function").
42. See generally id. at 133-51 (discussing, in detail, the history of the consular right to be notified of the
detention of nationals, and instances of state action affirming or discussing the right).
43. See CONSULAR ACCESS PUBLICATION, supra note 27, at 51-58 (providing a list of all of the United
States' consular relations agreements).
44. See id. at 13 (emphasizing that the consular notification agreements apply to American nationals
arrested abroad just as they apply to foreign nationals arrested in the United States).
45. See infra text accompanying note 46 (quoting the State Department mantra concerning the reciprocal
duty raised by the consular notification agreements).
46. CONSULAR ACCESS PUBLICATION, supra note 27, at 3.
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Although this directive from the State Department is couched in permissive terms,
the obligation to advise nationals is much more serious. This is because every
violation of the Convention can be considered a breach of a binding agreement
between the United States and another country.47 The remedy for the breach of a
treaty can be the suspension of the operation of the treaty between the nation that
has breached the treaty and the affected nation.48 It is therefore an open question
how many times the United States can violate the Vienna Convention before
Americans will be deprived of its benefits abroad4 9
However, ensuring compliance with consular notification obligations first
requires determining which rights are guaranteed by the various consular
agreements within the United States' legal system. The United States' consular
notification agreements, as treaties, are the "supreme Law of the Land. ' 50 They
preempt conflicting state law.5' A treaty is considered self-executing and equivalent
to an act of Congress when it can "operate[] ... without the aid of any legislative
provision. 52 The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is considered a self-
executing treaty.5 3 A self-executing treaty is subject to judicial interpretation
regarding the specific rights and benefits to be conferred on individuals by the
instrument.54 With these legal principles in mind, exactly which rights and benefits
47. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 346
(discussing the consequences of a material breach of a multilateral treaty).
48. Id. art. 60(2)(b) (recognizing that "[a] party specially affected by the breach [is entitled] to invoke it
as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the
defaulting State").
49. Cf. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615,622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring)
(The protections afforded by the Vienna Convention go far beyond Breard's case. United States
citizens are scattered about the world-as missionaries, Peace Corps volunteers, doctors, teachers and
students, as travelers for business and for pleasure. Their freedom and safety are seriously endangered
if state officials fail to honor the Vienna Convention and other nations follow their example.),
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
51. See TRIBE, supra note 29, § 4-5, at 226 (stating that it is "indisputable that a valid treaty overrides any
conflicting state law, even on matters otherwise within state control').
52. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see Head Money Cases: Edye v. Robertson, 112
U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) ("A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions
prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.'); see also Mark J. Kadish,
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Searchfor the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L.
565, 586-89 (1997) (discussing self-executing treaty doctrine).
53. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 91-9, app. 5 (1969) (Statement of J. Edward Lyerly, Deputy Legal Adviser for
Administration) (confirming before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the treaty is self-executing); see
also Kadish, supra note 52, at 588 n.147 (listing authority fdr the conclusion that the Vienna Convention is self-
executing).
54. See Kadish, supra note 52, at 586-89 (arguing that because the Supreme Court has decided that the
Supremacy Clause itself is not a source of federal rights, the treaty itself must be construed to confer private,
enforceable rights); see also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (1993) (comparing
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), where Justice Marshall held that a treaty was not self-executing,
with United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833), where Justice Marshall held that the same treaty was
self-executing after reviewing the Spanish-language version of the treaty).
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are bestowed on foreign nationals by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
is the subject of next section.
B. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations represents the will of the world
in regard to consular relations. One hundred sixty-three of the world's nations are
parties to the Convention.5 Even nations that are not officially parties to the
Convention may be bound by-and receive the benefit of-its provisions if, as is
widely thought, the Convention embodies customary international law.56
Article 36 of the Convention confers three rights upon consuls and foreign
nationals. 7 The first is the right of a consul to assist fellow nationals who have been
arrested or detained.58 The second is the right of nationals to determine whether
they desire such consular assistance. 9 The third is the right of the national to be
notified of the right to seek consular assistance.6° Under the terms of Article 36,
nations are bound to ensure that their laws and regulations give "full effect.., to
the purposes for which the... Article [is] intended.",6' This subsection briefly
explores each of these rights, their interaction, and history. This review illustrates
that the intent of Article 36 is to convey individual rights on foreign nationals. In
principle, therefore, under the self-executing treaty doctrine,62 this nation's legal
system should give effect to the rights conferred in Article 36.63
1. The "Primary" Right: The Right of Nations to Assist Their Nationals Who
Have Been Arrested or Detained
Through the use of consular officers, sovereign nations have traditionally had
the right to communicate with and assist their nationals who are arrested or detained
55. United Nations Treaty Database, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (visited Oct. 27, 1998),
<http:lwww.un.orglDepts/Treaty/finallts2/newfileslpart._iiLbool6.html>.
56. See LEE, supra note 25, at 26 (giving evidence that even states that were not parties to the Convention
felt bound by its provisions); see id. at 142 (suggesting that Article 36, when completed, codified the "broad
outlines of international custom").
57. See supra note 28 (setting forth the text of Article 36).
58. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 36(1) 21 U.S.T. at 100-01; see infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the
rights of nations under the Vienna Convention).
59. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 36(1), 21 U.S.T. at 100-01; see infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the
rights of individuals under the Vienna Convention).
60. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T. at 100-01.
61. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T. at 100-01.
62. Under self-executing treaty principles, if a treaty confers individual rights, those rights are enforceable
in our courts. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (outlining the basic principles of constitutional treaty
law).
63. But see infra Part ll.C (discussing the various conclusions of courts that have faced consular
notification questions).
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in foreign jurisdictions.' The drafters of the Convention unequivocally recognized
and codified this right in Articles 36(1)(a) and 36(1)(c).6 The United States has
long recognized the importance of ensuring that Americans detained or arrested
abroad are able to communicate with American consular officers.6 As early as
1935, the government had entered into international agreements conferring the right
of consular officials to be notified of an arrest of a national.67 The United States has
relied extensively on these agreements to protect Americans detained or arrested
abroad.68 By becoming a party to the Vienna Convention in 1963, the United States
was assured that it would be able to realize the benefits guaranteed by the
Convention in every nation with which the United States did not already have a
consular relations agreement. 69 Through the Vienna Convention and several
bilateral agreements, the United States has now contracted with almost every
country in the world to ensure that American nationals may receive the benefits of
consular assistance if they are arrested abroad.70
2. The "Secondary" Rights: The Right of a National to Determine Whether
to Seek Consular Assistance, and the Right to Be Notified of the Right to
Seek Consular Assistance
The right of a national to request consular access, and the right to be notified
of the right to consular access, are guaranteed in Article 36(1)(b) of the
Convention. 71 This provision shifts the focus of the Article away from the rights of
64. See LEE, supra note 25, at 134 ("Essential to the fulfillment of a consul's protective function are his
right to be informed immediately of a detention of nationals of the sending State, to visit them in prison, and to
assist them in legal and other matters."). Lee also sets forth substantial evidence showing that allowing detainees
to communicate with consular officials was the practice of states even before the Vienna Convention was signed.
See generally id. at 133-38 (exploring the evidence, including treaties and diplomatic notes, showing that allowing
consular assistance was the traditional practice of states, and explaining the limited circumstance under which such
assistance may have been denied).
65. See supra note 28 (providing the text of ArticIes 36(1)(a) and 36(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention).
66. See LEE, supra note 25, at 134 (noting several instances in which the United States reaffirmed its belief
in its right to protect its nationals and questioned other countries regarding possible violations of the right).
67. See id. (noting 28 international agreements into which the United States had entered prior to the Vienna
Convention, each of which have conveyed the right to be notified of the arrest of nationals).
68. See LEE, supra note 25, at 134-50 (detailing several instances, both before and after the Vienna
Convention, where the United States asserted the right to consular notification of the arrest of American nationals).
69. See generally S. EXEC. REP. 91-9, app. (1969) (Statement of J. Edward Lyerly, Deputy Legal Adviser
for Administration) (discussing the benefits of ratifying the Convention); S. EXEC. REP. 91-9 (1969)
(recommending that the Senate approve the ratification of the Convention).
70. See CONsULAR AccEss PUBLUCATION, supra note 27, at 50-57 (listing the countries orjurisdictions to
which the United States has consular obligations). According to the State Department publication, only 16
countries or jurisdictions do not have consular agreements with the United States. Id. These nations are:
Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d'Ivoire
(Ivory Coast), Libya, Mauritania, Monaco, Nauru, Qatar, San Marino, Sri Lanka, and Uganda. Id.
71. See Vienna Convention supra note 28, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T at 100-01 (emphasizing the relevant
language of Article 36).
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nations, and towards the rights of individual nationals. 2 Reaching the conclusion
that the Article guarantees individual rights, however, is not as easily accomplished
as concluding that the Article confers consular assistance rights upon nations.73 This
is because the Convention generally addresses consular operations, and not
individual rights.74 In fact, differing interpretations of Article 36 and the purpose
of the Convention have led to varying decisions in the courts regarding whether the
Convention grants individual rights.75
Evaluation of the history of the Convention, however, indicates that the grant
of individual rights in Article 36 was necessary to ensure that consular officers
would be able to avail themselves of their right to assist arrested or detained
nationals.76 The original draft of the Convention provided for mandatory consular
notification when a foreign national was detained in a foreign country." Several
nations objected to this provision .78 Among the objections was the argument that
an individual's wishes should be considered when determining whether or not the
national's consulate should be notified.79 Some states felt that automatic notification
would infringe on an individual's right of privacy.80 Eventually, the delegates
decided that to protect individual rights, consular officers would be notified of an
individual's arrest or detention only at the request of the individual.8"
72. The provision requires that a national be informed, without delay, of the availability of consular
assistance, and that the proper officials be notified if the national requests such assistance. See supra note 28
(quoting the text of Article 36(1)(b)).
73. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (illustrating how the Convention confers the right upon
a nation, through its consular officers, to assist its nationals).
74. The preamble of the Convention states that the Convention's primary function is to "ensure the
efficient performance of functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective states." Vienna Convention,
supra note 26, preamble, 21 U.S.T. at 79; cf. Kadish, supra note 52, at 593 (recognizing that the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations is "an awkward place to enumerate the rights of an individual national").
75. See infra notes 100-07 (summarizing the case law regarding whether the Convention grants individual
rights).
76. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (outlining the history of the provision).
77. LEE, supra note 25, at 138.
78. See id at 138-39 (listing several objections to the original mandatory notification provision).
79. See id. at 138-42 (describing the debate over Article 36 which took place at the Vienna Conference on
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); see also Kadish, supra note 52, at 596-600 (discussing the debate
over Article 36); S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas's Death Row and the Right of Access to
a Consul, 26 ST. MARY'S LU. 719,729-30 (1995) (same).
80. See Kadish, supra note 52, at 597-98 (reciting the concern of some Convention delegates that not all
detained nationals would desire that their nation be notified of their situation); see also Shank & Quigley, supra
note 79, at 730 ("Other states objected that a detainee might not want his detention to be known to officials of his
state of nationality.").
81. See LEE, supra note 25, at 142 (discussing the adoption of Article 36 at the Vienna Conference);
Kadish, supra note 52, at 597-99 (recounting the debate over whether consular notification should be at the
detainee's request or automatic). The United States has altered this provision in several bilateral treaties which
require mandatory notification of the consulate, regardless of whether the individual desires the consulate to be
notified; see generally CONSULAR ACCESS PUBLICATION, supra note 27, at 4-5 (explaining that some nations'
consulates must be notified regardless of the individual national's wishes). There are currently 56 mandatory
notification countries, many of which are successors to the consular relations agreement between the United States
and the former Soviet Union. See id. at 5 (listing the mandatory notification countries); cf. id at 5 n. 4 (explaining
1999 lArticle 36 and the States
Article 36(1)(b) also provides that detainees must be notified of their right to
seek consular access.82 The individual's right to notification of the availability of
consular assistance was a necessary corollary of the provision guaranteeing
individuals a choice of whether or not their consulate would be notified.83 Many
nations' representatives had expressed concerns that if consular notification was not
mandatory, detaining nations could merely claim that the individual had not
requested consular assistance, thus relieving that state of any duties under Article
36.84 Therefore, the last clause of Article 36(1)(b) was added, requiring the
detaining authorities to notify the detained individual of the possibility of consular
assistance.
C. The Courts and Consular Notification
This section briefly considers recent cases in which Article 36 claims were
raised. The review of these cases demonstrates two clear propositions: first, that
understanding the purpose of Article 36 is necessary to ensure that the treaty be
given the "full effect" required under the terms of the agreement; 86 and second, that
not only have courts failed to give Article 36 its "full effect" within this nation's
laws, but they have given the Article little effect at all.Y
that the Soviet Union's successor states are listed as separate countries).
82. See Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 36(I)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 101 ("The said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph .... ").
83. Cf Shank & Quigley, supra note 79, at 730 n.57 and accompanying text (noting the concern of states
that if consular access were to be based on a national's desire for consular access, a detaining state could rebut
claims of Convention violations by stating that the detainee had not requested consular access).
84. See LEE, supra note 25, at 140-42 (citing the concerns of numerous delegates at the conference that
disputes between nations regarding whether or not an individual had actually requested assistance would arise if
the notification of the consulate were made contingent on the request of the detained national).
85. See id. at 142 (indicating that the amendment which added the right to be notified of the availability
of consular assistance was a "logical sequel" to the compromise amendment which placed the decision of whether
the consul should be notified in the hands of the detainee); see also Shank & Quigley, supra note 79, at 730
(summarizing the debate over the Convention); Kadish, supra note 52, at 598 (noting that the provision granting
a foreign national the consular access notification right was a compromise agreement adopted only two days
before the close of the Convention).
86. See Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 36(2) ("[S]aid laws and regulations must enable full effect
to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended."); supra note 28 (quoting
the text of Article 36).
87. Cf infra Part ll.C (illustrating that in all but one Vienna Convention case, a remedy for the treaty's
breach has not been forthcoming).
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Although courts are aware of the importance of the Vienna Convention,88 thus
far the decisions in Article 36 cases have given the provision little practical effect.89
Courts have faced four main difficulties when addressing Vienna Convention
claims. First, many claims have met with procedural difficulties.90 Second, the
courts are reluctant to officially recognize that the Convention creates private
enforceable rights that grant individual nationals standing to raise claims under the
Convention.9t Third, even when the courts do recognize that an individual right
exists, they are unable or unwilling to accept arguments that the lack of consular
notification has somehow prejudiced the detainee. 92 Finally, exactly which remedy
should be granted upon a showing of prejudicial effect is unclear.93 This section
considers the first three of these difficulties.
88. Cf Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring) (concurring to
"emphasize the importance of the Vienna Convention"); Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996)
("While we in no way approve of Texas' failure to advise Faulder" [of his rights under the Convention,] [t]he
violation... does not merit reversal."); United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Takasugi, J., dissenting) (calling on the court to show the integrity of the nation's treaties by honoring their
provisions); id. (comparing a violation of the treaty as "equal [to] if not greater than a constitutional violation");
United States v. $69,530.00 in United States Currency, 22 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595 (W.D. Tex. 1998) ("Such
international agreements are important and are entitled to enforcement.... ."); Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp.
1255, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1996) ("Virginia's persistent refusal to abide by the Vienna Convention troubles the
Court.").
89. A few laudable cases have predicted possible enforcement of the Convention's mandates if future
violations occur. See, e.g., United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1098 n.10 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (stating
"that in an appropriate case, a violation of the Convention may warrant suppressing a defendant's statements or
granting other appropriate relief"); Colorado v. Mata Medina, No. 97 CR307 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 7, 1998)
(visited Jan. 7, 1999) <http://www.state.co.us/govdirlpdefLdirLibrary/Mata-MedinalAntonio%20Mata-
Medina%20Order.html> ("Nor does this Court by its ruling [that suppression would not be granted for a violation
of Article 36 in this case] suggest that suppression is never an option when an Article 36 violation occurs.").
90. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (discussing various procedural obstacles that have
stymied Vienna Convention claims).
91. See infra notes 100-07 (surveying the case law regarding whether the Convention grants individual
rights).
92. See infra notes 108-15 (discussing the case law regarding whether Vienna Convention violations
prejudice foreign nationals in the United States).
93. This Comment does not address the issue of what remedy should be granted for a prevailing claim
based on Article 36. Although the exclusion of evidence gained as a result of a violation of the Convention would
seem to be a possible remedy, courts have been reluctant to expand the use of the rule to cover treaty violations.
See, e.g., United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (refusing to apply the
exclusionary rule because the Vienna Convention does not provide for it and the violation of the treaty is not
equivalent to the violation of a constitutional right); United States v. $69,530 in United States Currency, 22 F.
Supp. 2d 593, 595 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (refusing to extend the exclusionary rule for violations of the Convention
because treaty rights "should not be cloaked with the 'nontextual and unprecedented remedy"' (citation omitted)).
However, in the sole case where the lack of notification was found to prejudice the national, a reversal of the
conviction was granted. See United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1980) (reversing a
conviction for illegal reentry after deportation after finding that the deportee had been prejudiced by the
government's failure to notify him of his consular notification rights); see also infra note 114 (discussing the
Rangel-Gonzales case).
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Foreign affairs issues often do not provide proper parties or issues for judicial
review. 4 The Vienna Convention cases are no exception. The rights under the
Convention must be "exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State." 5 Therefore, claims that are procedurally defaulted96 or that violate
the Eleventh Amendment 7 and are not reviewed have been said not to violate
Article 36.98 Similarly, although two courts have found that the Consulate may
bring a claim alleging that its right to assist its national has been violated, those
claims were dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 99
The question of whether Article 36 confers upon foreign nationals private
enforceable rights which grant them standing to raise claims under the Convention
has not been conclusively decided.1te The case law in the United States, however,
suggests a general acceptance of the argument that it does. 0 1 In Breard v. Greene,102
the Supreme Court stated that the Convention "arguably" confers individual
94. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 3 (surmising that foreign affairs issues do not ordinarily provide proper
parties or issues for judicial review). This has been particularly true with respect to the Vienna Convention cases,
the review of which has been hampered by procedural obstacles.
95. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T. at 101.
96. See, e.g., Breardv. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,375 (1998) (holding that Breard's Vienna Convention claims
were procedurally defaulted because he failed to raise them in state court); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 142 F.3d 1124,
1125 (9th Cir. 1998) (observing that the national's claim was procedurally defaulted for having failed to raise it
in state court until the third Post-Conviction Relief petition); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261-62 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding the claim to have been procedurally defaulted for not having been raised in a state
proceeding); Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that the claim was procedurally
defaulted).
97. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 377 (discussing why Paraguay's claims might violate the fundamental principle
of the Eleventh Amendment: that the states are immune from suits brought against them by foreign nations).
98. ld at 375-76 (stating that Breard failed to exercise his rights in conformity with United States law by
failing to raise his claims in state court); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir.
1999), withdrawn, 188 F.3d 1177 (explaining that most nationals have failed to exercise their rights in conformity
with U.S. laws by failing to raise their claims in state court).
99. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274-75 (E.D. Va. 1996), aft'd, 134 F.3d 622
(4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (concluding that Paraguay had standing to bring its claims under
the treaty because it was asserting its own rights and not Breard's, but finding no subject matter jurisdiction);
Consulate Gen. of Mexico v. Phillips, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (finding no subject matter
jurisdiction after distinguishing between the rights of a consulate and the rights of a defendant under the Vienna
Convention).
100. See generally United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095-96 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
(discussing the debate over whether or not the Convention confers rights on defendants or consuls). In
summarizing the debate, the court stated:
This is a murky inquiry indeed. The language of the Convention states that law enforcement officials
shall tell the arrestee of the arrestee's right to contact the consul. This seems to protect individual
rights. However, the introductory sentence of article 36 indicates that this provision is not designed
to benefit individuals, but rather seeks to 'facilitat[e] the exercise of consular functions .... '
Id. at 1095.
101. See infra notes 102-07 (surveying the cases that have discussed whether or not the Convention confers
individual rights).
102. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
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rights.' O3 Three circuit courts that have addressed Article 36 questions have all
assumed, without deciding, that the Convention creates individual rights." Eight
district and state courts have either explicitly or implicitly accepted the contention
that defendants have standing to raise Article 36 claims. 05 Meanwhile, only two
other courts have doubted that the Convention conveys individual rights. 106 Finally,
the Ninth Circuit seems to have illustrated the difficult nature of the standing
question by withdrawing, for en banc review, an earlier decision that had explicitly
held that a foreign defendant had individual rights under the Convention. 0 7
103. Id.; see id. at 376 ("The Vienna Convention-which arguably confers on an individual the right to
consular assistance following arrest-has continuously been in effect since 1969.").
104. See United States v. Salas, No. 98-4374, 1998 WL 911731, at *3 (4th Cir. 1998) (assuming defendant
had standing without deciding the issue); Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
Vienna Convention "requires an arresting government to notify a foreign national who has been arrested,
imprisoned or taken into custody or detention of his right to contact his consul"); cf Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511,
518-19 (2d Cir. 1994) (construing an INS regulation based on the Convention, and moving directly into
substantive matters without discussing standing).
105. Two districts courts have expressly recognized that defendants have privately enforceable rights under
the Convention. See United States v. Chaparro-Alacantara, 37 F Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (C.D. I11. 1999) (holding
that the defendants do have standing under Article 36 to address violations of the provision); United States v.
$69,530 in United States Currency, 22 F. Supp. 2d 593, 594 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (rejecting the government's
argument that the Convention creates no enforceable rights). Six courts have implicitly recognized that defendants
have standing by speaking of the defendants' "rights" under the Convention and evaluating their claims. See
United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095-96 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that the history, practice
of nations, and case law support a finding of standing, but leaving the issue undecided); Mami v. Van Zandt, No.
89 Civ. 0554, 1989 WL 52308, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (evaluating substantive aspects of the defendant's claim
without discussing standing); Cardona v. Texas, 973 S.W.2d 412,417-18 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (assuming that the
defendant had standing without discussing the issue); AI-Mosawi v. Oklahoma, 956 P.2d 906, 909 n.6 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1998) (discussing the substantive aspects of defendant's claim without addressing standing); Ohio v.
Loza, No. CA96-70-214, 1997 WL 634348, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (assuming without discussion that the
defendant had standing rights under the treaty); Colorado v. Mata-Medina, No. 97 CR307, at 4 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. May 7, 1998) (visited Jan. 7, 1999) <http.//www.state.co.us/gov.-dir/pdefLdir/Library/Mata-Medinal
Antonio%20Mata-Medina%200rder.html> (rejecting an argument that the defendant had a duty to request that
notice be given to the consulate, but not discussing the standing issue).
106. See United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253 (D. Utah 1999) (leaving the standing
question open, despite doubt that the Convention creates privately enforceable rights); Kasi v. Virginia, 508
S.E.2d 57, 63-64 (Va. 1998) (relying solely on the preamble of the treaty and the legal argument-misguided, in
this author's view-of the defendant, with neither mention of the text of Article 36 itself, nor case law
construction of the provision, to hold that the Convention does not confer individual rights).
107. See United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 188 F3d 1177 (9th Cir. 1999) (withdrawing two of the
circuit court's earlier decisions and ordering that the cases be re-heard en banc); see also United States v.
Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 188 F.3d 1177(holding that defendants
have individual rights under the Vienna Convention and standing to enforce those rights); United States v.
Oropeza-Flores, 173 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 188 F.3d 1177 (1999) (relying on Lombera-Camorlinga
for the proposition that Article 36(1)(b) creates individual rights). The Ninth Circuit's indecision in this area exists
despite the fact that they have dealt with standing in several other consular notification cases. See Villafuerte v.
Stewart, 142 F3d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998) (implying that the defendant had standing by stating that Article 36
"requires a detaining state to inform a detained foreign national of his right to consult with consulate officials,"
and moving on to other analyses); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[A]uthorities of the
receiving state are required to inform the arrested national 'without delay of his rights under [Article 36(1)(b)]."');
United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F2d 529, 532 (9th Cir 1980) (holding that INS regulations based on the
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The third problem that nationals raising Vienna Convention claims have faced
is the use of a prejudice standard to evaluate claims arising under the Convention.
In Breard, the Supreme Court implicitly approved of the use of a prejudice standard
to decide if violations of the Convention were meritorious. t 3 Under this standard,
foreign nationals must be able to show that the failure of the government to notify
them of their right to seek consular assistance had a prejudicial effect on their
trials.'09 Although the Breard statement was only dictum, every case since Breard
that has evaluated the merits of an Article 36 claim has looked for a showing of
prejudice."' Generally, courts have asked for evidence tending to show that the
defendant would have attempted to contact the consulate if he or she had known of
the right, and that the consulate would have assisted him or her."' Additionally,
defendants must argue how the lack of consular assistance prejudiced their
individual cases.112 They must make this claim with some specificity, and the claim
must not be mere speculation.1
3
The use of a prejudice analysis has thus far meant almost certain failure of an
Article 36 claim. For instance, of fifteen cases in which a court has analyzed a
defendant's claim for prejudice, only one such claim has survived." 4 However,
Vienna Convention establish personal rights); United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 n.6 (9th Cir.
1979) (rejecting the government's argument that the treaty was not for the benefit of individuals, but rather for
the benefit of consuls).
108. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,375-78 (1998) (analyzing Breard's prejudice claim despite the fact
that the Court found the claim was procedurally defaulted).
109. See i&. at 377 (noting that the Court believed that Breard's claim--that with the advice of his consulate
he would have accepted the state's offered plea bargain to avoid the death penalty-was far too speculative to
prove prejudice and warrant the overturning of his conviction).
110. See, e.g., Salas, No. 98-4374, 1998 WL 911731, at *3 (stating that the defendant must establish
prejudice to prevail on a motion to suppress on the ground that the defendant's Article 36 rights were violated);
United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096-98 (S.D. Cal, 1998) (denying motion to suppress
because the defendant had failed to make the requisite showing of prejudice); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d
57, 64 (Va. 1998) (theorizing, in dicta, that defendant's Article 36 claim of prejudice was at least as speculative
as Breard's). But see United States v. $69,530 in United States Currency, 22 F. Supp. 2d 593, 594 (W.D. Tex.
1998) (determining that requiring a showing of prejudice in civil forfeiture actions would be inappropriate).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1126 (C.D. Il1. 1999) (deciding
that the defendants failed to show prejudice because they failed to show that, if they had been advised of their
notification rights, they would have stopped speaking with INS agents); United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1254-55 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by an Article 36 violation
because the defendant did or could not show how contacting the consulate would have helped his case).
112. See, e.g., Salas, No. 98-4374, 1998 WL 911731, at *3 (finding that an Article 36 claim was properly
rejected because the defendant had not asserted how the claimed violation affected the outcome of his case).
113. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,377 (1998) (holding that Breard's claim-that if he had been
advised by consular officials, he would have accepted a life-sentence plea bargain-was "far more speculative
than the claims of prejudice courts routinely reject in those cases where an inmate alleges that his plea of guilty
was infected by attorney error").
114. In United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit evaluated the
consular notification claim of a deportee who had been convicted of illegal reentry. Id. at 529-30. The alien's
claim was based upon an INS regulation, which in turn was based upon Article 36. Id. at 530. The court found
prejudice because the alien had met the burden of presenting "evidence that he did not know of his right to consult
with consular officials, that he would have availed himself of that right had he known of it, and that there was a
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many of these claims failed because the defendant simply did not plead well.
15
Thus, the possibility still exists that, in a proper case, a well-pled showing of actual
prejudice may survive the prejudice analysis.
Proponents of the Convention, and of international law in general, can claim a
few victories in this area. First, the fact that many courts seem to have accepted the
premise that the Convention grants defendants rights that are enforceable in U.S.
courts ensures that in a proper case, a defendant, and thus a nation, may be granted
a remedy for a violation of the Convention. Second, as the Convention becomes
more widely known among defense attorneys, the likelihood of a successful claim
being raised greatly increases." 6 Finally, a few courts are beginning to aid in the
Convention's enforcement. For instance, a Colorado state court judge's ruling
informed law enforcement officials that the Convention's commands must be
followed and that suppression of evidence may be a possible remedy when
violations of the Convention occur."7 Another court has held that consular officials
do have standing to raise claims under the Convention for violations of their right
to be notified of a fellow national's detention and their right to assist that
national."1
8
However, the country should not wait for this area of law to develop one case
at a time. The treaty requires that "full effect" be given to the treaty through this
nation's laws." 9 Allowing courts to continue to construe the treaty's rights and
remedies without guidance will lead to more violations of the treaty by the United
States. Therefore, federal legislation or an authoritativejudicial decision specifying
likelihood that the contact would have resulted in assistance to him in resisting deportation," without the
government presenting any evidence to rebut the alien's claim. Id. at 533. Although Rangel-Gonzales was based
on the INS regulations and not the treaty itself, the case has been cited in subsequent Article 36 cases. E.g., United
States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, -F.3d-, 1999 WL 160848, at *3 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 188 F.3d 1177
(1999).
115. See, e.g., Salas, No. 98-4374, 1998 WL 911731, at *3 (finding that a national failed to meet the
prejudice requirement because the national failed to show how the lack of notification affected the outcome of
the case); United States v. Maldonado-Vences, No. 98-4499, 1998 WL 911711, at *2 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding no
prejudice where the national failed to present evidence that he had tried to contact the consulate, even after he was
informed of the availability of consular assistance).
116. See generally, e.g., John Cary Sims & Linda E. Carter, Representing Foreign Nationals: Emerging
Importance of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as a Defense Tool, THE CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 1998,
at 28 (promoting awareness and use of the Convention as a defense tool).
117. See Colorado v. Mata-Medina, No. 97 CR307, at 4 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 7, 1998) (visited Jan. 7, 1999)
<http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/pdefl-dir/LibraryMata-Medina/Antonio%20Mata-Medina%200rder.html>
(informing local law enforcement officials of the need to enforce the Convention, and reserving the right to
suppress evidence as a result of a violation of the Convention).
118. See Consulate Gen. of Mexico v. Phillips, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322-23 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (finding that
the Mexican Consulate had a right to be notified and to be of assistance to the national, and that the consulate also
had standing to assert that right).
119. See Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 36(2), at 101 (setting forth a dual requirement for the
Article's enforcement: the Article "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
state, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended").
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how to implement the treaty, and mandating the remedy for its violation, is
necessary to guide the judiciary.t2
Before fashioning this law, however, a threshold question may be considered:
Does the state immunity from federal commandeering' 2' extend to the area of
foreign affairs, an area where the federal government has historically enjoyed
complete control? The next section considers this question.
Ill. CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND THE STATES
The federal government has historically enjoyed vast control over the conduct
and design of the nation's foreign affairs.'2 This control stems from a string of
judicial decisions that have significantly broadened the Constitution's textual
delegation of federal foreign affairs powers.12 These decisions have also seemingly
deprived the states of any sovereignty in the area of foreign affairs. 24 The decisions
reflect the opinions of the Court, the founders, and international law scholars that,
in the area of foreign relations, it is imperative that the nation speak with one voice,
lest actions of the individual states implicate the responsibility of the entire
union.1
25
However, two recent cases have bestowed upon the states a narrow immunity
from federal regulation.' 26 This immunity stems not from any explicit constitutional
text, but rather from an interpretation of the history and structure of the Constitution
itself.'2 7 This interpretation has led the current Court to conclude that the federal
government was designed to act upon individuals, not upon the states. 28 Therefore,
the Court has decided that the federal government cannot commandeer the
legislature or officials of the states and direct them to carry out federally designed
programs.1
29
Still, the question remains: What about an area where recurring omissions by
state officials violate international law and legally implicate the responsibility of
120. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 167 (explaining that federal remedies for state violations of international
obligations are often not available or timely).
121. See infra Part M.C (discussing the development of astate immunity from federal commandeering of
state officials and legislatures).
122. See infra Part 1ll.B (discussing the broad foreign affairs powers of the national government).
123. See infra Part I.B (same).
124. See infra Part II.B (same).
125. See, e.g., notes 180-84 and accompanying text (relating the reasons why national policy must prevail
over state policies in the area of foreign relations).
126. See infra Part II.C (discussing the New York v. United States and Printz v. United States cases).
127. See infra Part IIJ.C (same).
128. See infra Part II.C (same).
129. See infra Part II.C (same).
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the United States as a whole?1 30 This is what is occurring in the Vienna Convention
cases. Because no federal legislation that would give effect to Article 36 within the
states has been approved,1 31 the government has relied upon the State Department
to educate the states regarding the United States' obligations under the
Convention. 132 The states are then relied upon to comply with the treaty.133 As the
Breard, Faulder, and LaGrand situations illustrate, however, the states are violating
the treaty." Under these circumstances, when important international obligations
are at stake, the question arises whether the federal government may require state
officials to carry out an international responsibility.
A. Consular Notification Issues and Federalism Concerns
1. Vienna Convention Cases and Federalism Issues
"[W]here foreign affairs begin to touch the states.., the plenary powers of the
national government take on all the colors of federalism."1 35 When a state arrests
a foreign national, that state becomes tangentially involved in the conduct of the
nation's foreign affairs, and must take account of international obligations
pertaining to the treatment of that national.136 The federal government could attempt
to preempt all of these interactions, but that method of ensuring compliance with
the nation's international obligations is impractical. 137 Therefore, the interactions
130. Even if the direct actions of the signatory, the United States, are not the cause of the violation,
violations by the states can implicate the responsibility of the United States as a whole. See ILC Draft Articles on
State Responsibility, ILC's 1996 Report, U.N. G.A.O.R., 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, art.7(1), 125 available at
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/96repfra.htm> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("The
conduct of an organ of a territorial governmental entity within a State shall also be considered as an act of that
State under international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question"); see also
ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE 200 (Kraus
Reprint Co. 1970) (1938) (stating briefly that a claim by one nation against another would be justified when a
nation fails to give an arrested foreign national the opportunity to communicate with his or her consul).
131. See generally Shank & Quigley, supra note 79, at 738-39 (discussing the lack of laws governing state
and municipal implementation of the Vienna Convention). But see The Recognition of International Treaties Act
of 1965, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 901.26 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring officials to notify embassies when foreign
nationals are detained, but specifying that lack of notification is not grounds for a defense in a criminal
proceeding).
132. Cf. CONSULAR ACCESS PUBLiCATION, supra note 27, at 4 (promulgating procedures for state officials
to follow when a foreign national is arrested or detained).
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text (setting forth the details of these cases).
135. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 167.
136. See id, at 150-51 (acknowledging that even though supreme authority over foreign affairs rests with
the federal government, the states inevitably touch foreign affairs in the course of their everyday events).
137. See id. at 150 (recognizing that the federal government could, in principle, bring all state interaction
with foreign affairs under its control, but that it has no inclination to do so).
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between state governments and foreign nationals will occur, and, in theory, are to
be guided by any international agreements that pertain to the national.
138
Contrast this duty of implementation with the U.S. Supreme Court's recent
teachings on the design of the nation's government. The Court has embraced the
notion that the dual system of sovereign governments was designed to protect
individuals, not state or national governments. 139 This design was intended to
protect "the diverse needs of a heterogenous society,"1 40 and to check potential
abuses of governmental power'41 by either the state or the federal government.
There may be situations, however, where state or federal officials desire to stray
from the federal system to avoid responsibility for tough decisions.142 For instance,
"[i]f a federal official is faced with the alternative of choosing a location [for a
nuclear waste disposal site] or directing the States to do it, the official may well
prefer the latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision."'
43
Shades of this motive color Vienna Convention cases. In the Breard and Faulder
cases, for example, the Secretary of State asked the governors of each state to stay
the executions. 44 This was the national government's only action in favor of
upholding the Convention, even though other actions may have been more
effective. 145 This left the governors with a difficult decision in each case-whether
to adhere to an international obligation that most of their constituents probably did
not know of or understand, or whether to adhere to their states' criminal justice
138. Cf id at 150-51 (explaining that the duties under many of the nation's international agreements are
left to the states to be implemented). In some instances, the federal government has appended federal-state clauses
onto treaties, indicating the intention to leave implementation of the treaty rights in the hands of each state. See
Id. at 151 (explaining that such clauses were added to human rights agreements during the 1990's). However, no
such clause was appended to the Vienna Convention.
139. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) ("h[e] separation of the two spheres is one of
the Constitution's structural protections of liberty."); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)
(explaining that the division of authority between the federal and state governments exists for the benefit of
individuals); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991) (listing the benefits to individuals under the federalist
structure of government).
140. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
141. See id (observing that the potential check on governmental abuses of power is one of the principal
benefits of a federal system); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 921-22 (reaffirming Gregory).
142. See New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83 (explaining that federal officials can avoid responsibility for
choosing a location for a nuclear waste dump by directing the states to choose the location, and that state
lawmakers may wish to avoid responsibility by having Congress select the location).
143. Id. at 182-83; see id. (contending that state officials cannot consent to being commandeered by
Congress because doing so may relieve both federal and state lawmakers from responsibility for difficult
decisions-a proposition that would hardly advance federalism).
.144. See supra note 11 (citing the response of the Secretary of State in the Breard and Faulder situations).
145. In fact, in the Breard case, the Secretary of State solicited the Governor of Virginia to stay the
executions, while the Department of Justice opposed Breard and Paraguay's last-minute petitions for certiorari
in the Supreme Court. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to US.
Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 676 (1998) (relating the contradictory positions of the Department of
State in the Breard case).
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concerns by enforcing the penalties given to the defendants by the state.146 The
response of the governors was hardly surprising. In each case, the governors upheld
their state laws over the Vienna Convention concerns. 47 George W. Bush, the
governor of Texas, left no doubt as to where his loyalty was, stating: "In general,
I will uphold the laws of the State of Texas, regardless of the nationality of the
person involved."'
48
The Supreme Court also seemed to have federalism concerns when it discussed
Breard's situation in its short per curiam opinion denying Breard's petition for
certiorari:
It is unfortunate that this matter comes before us while proceedings are
pending before the ICJ that might have been brought to that court earlier.
Nonetheless, this Court must decide questions.., on the basis of law. The
Executive Branch, on the other hand, in exercising its authority over
foreign relations may, and in this case did, utilize diplomatic discussion
with [Breard's home nation]. Last night the Secretary of State sent a letter
to the Governor of Virginia requesting that he stay Breard's execution. If
the Governor wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his
prerogative. But nothing in our existing case law allows us to make that
choice for him.
149
Does this dictum suggest that this Court, ever-mindful of protecting the states'
rights, was uncomfortable with forcing implementation of this treaty, a duty
delegated to the executive branch, upon the states? Although the Court has in the
past deferred to the will of the State Department when that deference meant only
the bending of a judicially created doctrine, 50 the tenets of federalism, created by
146. That the decision was the Governor's to make, rather than the Supreme Court's, was explicitly stated
by the Breard Court. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (quoting the Court's dicta with regard to who had
the power to decide whether to stay Breard's execution in light of the order of the World Court).
147. See, e.g.. Heather Urquides, Hul Denies Clemency Board Plea for LaGrand ARZ. DAiLY STAR, Mar.
3, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5715004, at IA (reporting that Arizona Governor Jane Hull decided to move
forward with the execution of Walter LaGrand despite the fact that the Arizona Executive Board of Clemency had
granted LaGrand a sixty-day reprieve so that Germany would have time to present its case to the International
Court of Justice); Virginia Executes Paraguayan Murderer: Sentence Carried Out Despite Requests from U.S.
Secretary of State, World Court to Block It, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Apr. 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL
17657041, at A03 (relating that Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore refused to halt Breard's execution despite the
Order of the World Court and request from the United States Secretary of State that the execution be blocked);
infra note 148 and accompanying text (stating the reaction of Texas Governor George W. Bush to Faulder's
Vienna Convention claims).
148. Lyman, supra note 10.
149. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998).
150. See generally First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765-70 (1972)
(accepting the State Department's theory that the act of state doctrine should not govern when its application
would frustrate foreign affairs, because the doctrine was judicially created to advance the interests of foreign
affairs).
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the Constitution's very structure, may be too important to bend.15 Thus, the
deference the Court showed the governors raises doubts as to the possibility of ever
attaining consistent enforcement within the states of Article 36 under the
government's current program.
B. The Vast Foreign Affairs Powers of the Federal Government
To truly understand the conflict between the foreign affairs powers of the
federal government and the states' rights-based commandeering immunity, a
discussion of the development of both of these extraconstitutional grants of power
must ensue. In the area of foreign affairs, the federal government enjoys control
over the conduct of the nation's foreign relations to such a vast extent that it
exceeds explicit constitutional authority.' The breadth of this federal control can
be attributed to judicial recognition of the need of the union, in the area of foreign
relations, to speak with one voice. 53 This section discusses the leading cases
developing and defining the limits of the federal foreign affairs powers.
The broadest finding of extraconstitutional federal foreign affairs powers came
in 1936 in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.'s4 In 1934, Congress
authorized President Roosevelt to prohibit the sale of arms to countries engaged in
armed conflict in the Chaco.' 55 The President issued a proclamation prohibiting
such sales. t56 When indicted for conspiracy to sell arms to foreign governments in
violation of the joint resolution of Congress, Curtiss-Wright argued that the Joint
Resolution was an unconstitutional delegation of law-making authority to the
executive branch. 57 On appeal from a demurrer in favor of Curtiss-Wright, the
Supreme Court held that, in the area of foreign affairs, the federal government's
powers extended beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution. 158 In
reaching this holding, the Court recognized that, to avoid embarrassment and
achieve success in the nation's international goals, executive actions would need
151. See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 145, at 676 (asserting that in Breard the federal
government correctly assigned great weight to the interests of Virginia).
152. As Professor Henkin points out, the Constitution does address foreign affairs powers often; however,
it does not come close to covering every possible aspect of foreign relations. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 14-16
(discussing the '"spotty' treatment of foreign relations in the Constitution"). For instance, the Constitution
delegates the power to make treaties but not to break them, and the power to make war but not to make peace. Id.
at 14. Highly relevant to this Comment is the delegation of the power to define and punish violations of
international law, but not the power to "carry out (the nation's] obligations under international law." Id.
153. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text (summarizing why federal priorities must preempt state
priorities in the area of foreign affairs).
154. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
155. Id. at 311.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 314-15.
158. See generally id. at 314-22 (discussing the reasons that federal foreign affairs powers exceed explicit
constitutional authority).
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to be free "from statutory restriction[s] which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved."159
The Court used the Curtiss-Wright case to solidify the power of the federal
government in the area of foreign relations.160 Using sweeping dicta, the Court
clarified its sentiment regarding the federal government's foreign affairs authority,
declaring: "The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers
except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution... is categorically true
only in respect of our internal affairs.''16! The Court further ruled that the states
retained no sovereignty in the area of foreign affairs, because they never had
sovereignty in the first place, and stated: "[S]ince the states severally never
possessed international powers, such powers could not have been carved from the
mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States from some
other source."' 62 According to the Court, that source was the British Crown.1
63
Based on this theory, the Court reasoned that in order to act as a sovereign nation,
the United States government must possess all powers necessary to conduct
international relations.
6
In Missouri v. Holland,es the Supreme Court evaluated a claim that touched
upon the limits of the treaty power with regard to federalism and the Tenth
Amendment. In 1918, Congress enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which
"prohibited the killing, capturing or selling" of certain birds unless those acts were
done in a fashion permitted by the Act."' According to the Court, a similar piece
of domestic legislation, justified under the Commerce Clause, had been declared
unconstitutional in the district courts.' 67 In Holland, the State of Missouri sued a
federal game warden to prevent the warden from enforcing the Act on the ground
that the Act unconstitutionally interfered with the Tenth Amendment rights of the
State. 168 The issue was whether the United States could enforce legislation, enacted
159. Id. at 320.
160. See TRIBE, supra note 29, at 211 (recognizing that the Curtiss-Wright decision "might have been
bottomed upon narrower grounds," but that Justice Sutherland used the case to develop his theories about federal
foreign affairs powers).
161. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315-16 (addressing a separation of powers argument advanced by a
private corporation against the government).
162. Id. at 316.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 318. Although the Court's reasoning and history in Curtiss- Wright have been subject to criticism,
the holding remains strong law. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 19-21 (suggesting that although Justice
Sutherland's history may have been suspect, his decision was constitutionally sound); id. (discussing criticisms
of Justice Sutherland's history and sovereignty theory).
165. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
166. See id. at 431(explaining the provisions of the Act).
167. Id. at 432.
168. Id. at430-31.
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pursuant to a treaty, that it could not have enforced without the treaty. 69 Missouri's
core argument was that the treaty power was a limited power, and stated: "[O]ne
such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the
powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do."'170 Addressing this argument for
the Court, Justice Holmes framed the argument in terms of the Tenth Amendment,
stating:
The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be
found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by
some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment.
We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that
Amendment has reserved. 7'
Holmes rejected Missouri's argument, reasoning that the treaty power had been
delegated to the federal government, and, therefore, "whatever is within its scope
is not reserved to the states: [The Tenth Amendment is not material.'
172
The Holland opinion, however, did not envision complete federal control over
foreign affairs. Rather, the Court only foreclosed states' rights arguments based on
the Tenth Amendment. 173 Therefore, arguments based on other theories of state
sovereign immunity may be outside of Holland's holding." One example of this
proposition, offered by Professor Henkin, is "a treaty that commands state
legislatures... or coopts state officials."' 75
Another question the Holland Court left open was whether the government
could legislate contrary to a specific constitutional prohibition, if the legislation was
pursuant to a treaty.176 In Reid v Covert,177 the Supreme Court answered this
question in the negative when it held that treaties themselves must comply with
specific constitutional prohibitions. 78 The Court reasoned that to rule otherwise
169. Id. at432. ThestatuteconsideredinHollandwas promulgatedtoprotectmigratorybirds. Id. at431.The
statute was enacted pursuant to a treaty into which the United States had entered into with Great Britain
concerning the protection of birds that traversed between the United States and Canada. Id. Similar domestic
legislation had been struck down in the district courts. Id. at 432.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 433-34.
172. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 191 (summarizing Holmes' argument in Holland).
173. Id. at 193 (emphasizing that Holland did not say that there were no limitations on the federal treaty
power, only that there were none stemming from "invisible radiations" from the Tenth Amendment).
174. Id. at 193-94 (proposing hypothetical situations that might raise state sovereign immunity arguments).
175. Id.
176. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 ("The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to
be found in the Constitution.").
177. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
178. Id. at 16-18 (distinguishing Missouri v. Holland on the grounds that the treaty considered in that case
was not inconsistent with any constitutional prohibition).
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would have the impermissible effect of allowing for amendment of the Constitution
through use of a treaty.
179
State policies and laws that are contrary to national foreign policy are also
given no constitutional protection. ' ° In several cases, the Supreme Court has
discussed why federal foreign policy must outweigh state laws or policies.'8 ' The
discussion in the two cases quoted below illustrates well the importance of
deferring to national policy over inconsistent state policies:
If state laws and policies did not yield before the exercise of the external
powers of the United States, then our foreign policy might be thwarted.
These are delicate matters. If State action could defeat or alter our foreign
policy, serious consequences might ensue. The nation as a whole would be
held to answer if a State created difficulties with a foreign power.
8 2
Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties
and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation,
imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign
relations be left entirely free from local interference. 83
Thus, the cases have developed a broad national power in the area of foreign
affairs. However, as Professor Henkin points out, this supreme national authority
over foreign affairs does not-and could not-serve to completely preempt all state
involvement in federal affairs.184
C. Recent Cases Developing a Narrow State Immunity from Federal
"Commandeering" of State Legislatures or Officials
Poised against the weighty authority in favor of preferring federal foreign
policy over state interests are two seemingly unrelated cases that have developed
a narrow state immunity against federal intrusion. In New York v. United States,85
179. Id. at 17.
180. See generally TRIBE, supra note 29, § 4-6 (explaining that because all foreign policy responsibility is
in the federal government, any encroachment that distorts this responsibility is unconstitutional).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (discussing why state action which is inconsistent
with foreign policy should not be upheld); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (rejecting a Pennsylvania
statute regarding the registration of aliens 6n the grounds that the state statute conflicted with federal law); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (upholding an international compact against a contrary state policy);
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879) (reversing a state court decision which upheld a state law denying
Swiss claims to intestate property interests, when a treaty between the United States and Switzerland would have
permitted the Swiss heirs to sell the property interests).
182. Pink, 315 U.S. at 232.
183. Hines, 312 U.S. at 63.
184. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 150 (discussing the relationship between foreign affairs and the states).
185. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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the Court considered certain provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985.186 This Act attempted to resolve the radioactive waste
disposal problem in the states, which had resulted from having too much low-level
waste and not enough waste-disposal sites."s The Act was based largely on a
compromise proposal submitted to Congress by the National Governors'
Association.1 88 Under the "take-title" provision of the Act, states were to provide
for a method of private low-level waste disposal by 1996, or they would be forced
to take title to the waste. 19 Although New York had participated in the Act's
formulation, 90 by 1990 it had been unable to provide a site for the waste's disposal
within the state, and had not joined an interstate compact enabling it to dispose of
its waste in another state.19' Thus, New York challenged the Act, arguing that it was
inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment because, "[riather than addressing the
problem of waste disposal by directly regulating the generators and disposers of
waste .... Congress ha[d] impermissibly directed the States to regulate in th[e]
field."
192
The Court addressed New York's Tenth Amendment argument by looldng first
at the interaction between the amendment and Congress' enumerated powers.193 The
Court recognized that although Congress' enumerated powers have been broadly
interpreted to greatly expand the federal government's role in the republic, they are
not without limits.' 94 The Court felt that the Tenth Amendment serves to limit the
powers of Congress by retaining for the states any powers not specifically delegated
to Congress, just as the First Amendment--or any other amendment-could serve
to limit Congress' powers by its prohibitions on governmental actions.'95
However, a decision based wholly on the Tenth Amendment would necessarily
have involved rearguing the Court's Tenth Amendment differences evident in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.196 Thus, Justice O'Connor,
186. Pub. L. No. 99-240,99 Star. 1842 (codified at42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2021b-2021 (West 1994)).
187. See New York, 505 U.S. at 150-54 (explaining the history of the "take title" provision).
188. Ia at 151.
189. IM. at 153-54 (setting forth the text of the take title provision).
190. Id. at 181 (discussing the argument that New York had consented to the statute's enactment, and had
reaped many benefits from the statute).
191. Id. at 154.
192. Id. at 154; see id. at 160 (explaining New York's argument).
193. IM. at 156-57; see also infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's Tenth
Amendment analysis in New York).
194. New York, 505 U.S. at 157 (stating that the "Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal
Government is subject to limits that may... reserve power to the States").
195. Id. at 156 (noting that congressional regulation of publishers, although valid under the Commerce
Clause, would still be constricted by the First Amendment).
196. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, a divided Court held that state employers were subject to the wage
and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (West 1998), thus overruling
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which had relied on the Tenth Amendment when
prohibiting Congress from enforcing the Act against the states in areas of "traditional government function."
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57. The Garcia Court held that the traditional governmental function test had proven
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writing for the New York Court, seemed to reach for another basis to develop state
sovereignty.' 97 The Court found such a basis not in any explicit constitutional text,
but rather in the structure of the Constitution itself. 98 After considering the intent
of the founders, the Court reasoned that congressional powers were intended to
operate on individuals directly, not on individuals via the states.199 The Court
asserted that the states "are not mere political subdivisions[,] ... regional offices[,
or] administrative agencies of the Federal Government... the Federal Government
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.
' 200
Thus, the take-title provision, which offered states the "'choice' of either accepting
ownership of [low level radioactive] waste or regulating according to the
instructions of Congress,"20' was held unconstitutional because it commandeered
the state legislatures by offering them only the "choice between two
unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques. 20 2
In Printz v. United States,2 3 the Court extended this immunity to state officials
when it evaluated whether certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act 4 were constitutional.20 5 One provision of the Act established an
instant background check to be conducted by the federal government on all handgun
purchasers.206 Until the federal system could be implemented, interim provisions
were enacted which directed state and local officials to conduct background checks
on the prospective gun purchasers. 21c The Court found that the provisions enlisted
unworkable as a way of divining state immunity. See id. at 538-47 (analyzing judicial attempts at reviewing which
state activities were protected traditional governmental functions and thus immune from federal encroachment,
and which were not). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Garcia, predicted that the federalism principles of National
League would once "again command the support of a majority of this Court." Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
However, in New York, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, quickly distinguished Garcia and a host of
other Tenth Amendment cases on the grounds that the New York case was not one "in which Congress ha[d]
subjected a State tothe same legislation applicable to private parties." New York, 505 U.S. at 160.
197. Cf. New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (leaving open the question of where the "outer limits" of state
sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment reside).
198. See id. (basing the Court's holding on the Constitution generally, as opposed to any specific
amendment).
199. See id. at 163-66 (quoting an array of statements by the Constitution's framers to support this
proposition).
200. lI. at 188.
201. Id. at 175.
202. Id. at 176.
203. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
204. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993); see id (amending the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 921-930 (West 1974 and Supp. 1999).
205. See infra note 207 (explaining which provisions of the Act were examined in the Printz case).
206. See'Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-04 (discussing the provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993)).
207. Local law enforcement officials would have been required under the interim provisions to receive
information forms from gun dealers regarding persons who were seeking to purchase handguns, and check the
background of those proposed purchasers by conducting research into designated record-keeping systems. 18
U.S.C.A. § 922(s)(2) (West Supp. 1999). If the proposed sale would be unlawful-i.e., the would-be purchaser
could not lawfully possess a handgun-the official was not required by the statute to take any specific action. See
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the aid of state officials, without compensation, into the enforcement of a federal
program." 8 The Court then extended the immunity drawn in New York and found
some of the interim provisions unconstitutional.2" The Court reasoned that
Congress cannot compel the states to enforce a federal regulatory program or
2101directive,"O either by compelling the states to make laws,1 or by "conscripting the
State's officers directly."
212
Because the commandeering immunity is found in the structure of the
Constitution, as opposed to any enumerated power, the immunity may exist in the
area of foreign affairs.21 3 The next section examines the State Department's
Consular Access Program, which proposes "instructions" to state and local law
enforcement officials on how to implement Article 36 of the Vienna Convention in
their jurisdictions.214
D. The Current Method of Implementing Article 36: Utilizing State Officials to
Carry out the Article's Provisions
1. The State Department's Consular Notification and Access Program
Consular notification procedures, as outlined in the State Department's
Consular Notification and Access handbook,215 place on local officials burdens
Printz, 521 U.S. at 904-05 (opining that the reason an official was not required by the Brady Act to take any action
if a transfer would be unlawful was presumably because the official would be required under state law to take
action). However, the official could, if he or she so chose, notify the dealer that the transaction would be unlawful.
See id. at 903 ("The Act does not require the CLEO to take any particular action of he determines that a pending
transaction would be unlawful; he may notify the firearms dealer to that effect, but is not required to do so."). If
notification was made to the dealer, the official, upon request, would be required to provide the rejected purchaser
with a written explanation of the reason for the sale having been deemed unlawful. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(s)(6)(C)
(West Supp. 1999). If the official determined that the sale would be lawful, he or she would be required to destroy
the records in his or her possession relating to the application. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(s)(6)(B)(i) Vest Supp. 1999).
208. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 899 (arguing that the power of the federal government is increased
immeasurably, and unconstitutionally, if the federal branch is "able to impress into its service-and at no cost to
itself-the police officers of the 50 States").
209. In the end, the Court only struck down the background check and receipt-of-forms requirements. Id.
at 935. The Court reasoned that the additional requirements would only apply if an official had voluntarily
conducted a background check, and because neither of the Printz petitioners had done so, the provisions were
inoperative as to the petitioners, and therefore were not considered. Id. at 933-34.
210. Id. at 935.
211. See id (reaffirming New York).
212. Id.
213. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 166-67 (recognizing that it is not settled whether the state immunity
drawn in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), would apply in the area of foreign affairs regulations).
214. See infra Part III.D.2 (analyzing the State Department program under the doctrine set forth in Printz
and New York).
215. Supra note 27.
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nearly as onerous as the Brady Act's requirements.1 6 Local officials must take
several actions to ensure that consular notification obligations are fulfilled when a
foreign national is detained.21 7 First, "[i]n all cases, the foreign national must be told
of the right to consular notification and access., 21 8 To comply with the notification
requirement, the official may need to advise the national of the availability of
consular assistance in the national's native language. 2 9 Keeping written records of
the notification so as to counter any claims that the national was not notified is
strongly recommended by the Department. 20 Second, the official must determine
whether notification of the national's consulate is mandatory, or at the national's
option.22' This involves determining whether or not the national's home country has
entered into a bilateral agreement with the United States, apart from the Vienna
Convention, that makes notification of the national's consulate mandatory.2
Finally, if notification of the national's consulate is necessary, then, either by
request of the national or because of a mandatory notification requirement, the
nearest consulate must be located and notified.223 Keeping records of the
notification is also suggested by the instructions.224 The obligatons of Article 36
216. Compare CONSULAR ACCESS PUBLICATION, supra note 27, at 13-15 (giving "Detailed Instructions on
the Treatment of Foreign Nationals"), with Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 902-06 (1997) (detailing the Brady Act's
requirements).
217. See generally CONSULAR ACCESS PUBLICATION, supra note 27, at 13-15 (discussing the consular
notification procedure).
218. IdM at 13.
219. See ifL at 20 (referring officials to Part Four of the instructions where translations of the notification
of consular access statement are given in several foreign languages).
220. See id. at 14 (stating that "[liaw enforcement agencies should keep written records sufficient to show
compliance with the above notification requirements").
221. Article 36 requires consular notification at the foreign national's option. See supra Part lI.B (discussing
the history of Article 36, which calls for notification at the national's option rather than mandatory notification
in all cases). However, the United States has entered into several bilateral treaties with other countries that call
for mandatory notification of the consulate regardless of the national's wishes. See CONSULAR ACCESS
PUBLICATION, supra note 27, at 13-14 (explaining that the United States has entered into some bilateral
agreements with other countries where notification of the consulate is mandatory instead of at the national's
option).
222. See CONSULAR ACCESS PUBLICATION, supra note 27, at 14 (discussing mandatory notification
requirements). The State Department included a list of mandatory-notification countries in the State Department
publication. Id. at 5; see also id. at 47-49 (reproducing the text of all of the mandatory notification provisions).
Presumably, when the list of mandatory-notification countries changes, the Department would send an updated
list to state officials so as to prevent the officials from making mistakes regarding whether a country is a
mandatory- or optional-notification country. Examples of mandatory-notification countries are: China, Costa Rica,
Nigeria, Russia (and other successor states of the former Soviet Union), and the United Kingdom. Id.
223. See id. at 60-72 (listing the telephone and facsimile numbers of all consulates in the United States).
224. See id. at 14 (discussing the records local officials should keep in order to rebut claims of breaches of
consular access obligations).
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are fulfilled once the consulate is notified. The consulate will then determine
whether, and to what extent, it will assist the national. 6
The legal authority for imposing consular notification duties upon the states is
set forth by the Department in the "Basis for Implementation" section of the
instructions.22 7 That section states that "Ithe obligations of consular notification are
binding on states and local governments, primarily by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause." 8 The section also states that where no treaty directly addressing consular
notification exists between the United States and the national's country, then the
obligation to notify will still arise because of customary international law, which
is also binding on the states.229 The section also contains suggestions for
implementation of the obligations, such as using the Department's booklet directly,
issuing directives to subordinates, incorporating the instructions into police
manuals, and distributing the booklet's "detailed instructions" section directly to
law enforcement officers.230
2. Consideration of the State Department's Program Under Printz v. United
States
The State Department's program may be similar enough to the Brady Act
requirements to warrant review of the program to determine whether it
unconstitutionally commandeers state officials.23t Like the Brady Act's interim
provisions, the State Department's instructions require state actors to perform
administrative functions to ensure a federal policy is upheld. ' Thus, the State
225. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 36 (setting forth no additional requirements other than
notification "without delay").
226. See CONSULAR ACCESS PUBLICATION, supra note 27, at 22 (describing what actions a consular officer
may take when he or she is contacted regarding a detained national).
227. See id. at 44 (citing the Supremacy Clause, case law, and customary international law as authority for
the proposition that the obligations are binding upon state and local officials). The Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution mandates that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
228. See id. (quoting the Supremacy Clause and citing United States v. County ofArlington, 669 F.2d 925
(4th Cir. 1982), for the proposition that the obligation of consular notification is binding upon the states).
229. See id. (directing states to notify the consuls in the absence of a treaty on point, because consular
notification is customary in international law); see also HENKIN, supra note 20, at 233 (relating that
"[i]nternational law is law for the United States[,].... binding ... on state legislatures and state officials, down
to the lowest official of city, town or village...
230. Id,
231. See supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and reasoning of Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), where the Supreme Court found that certain provisions of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act unconstitutionally commandeered state law enforcement officers).
232. See supra Part lIM.D.1 (discussing the State Department's Consular Notification and Access Program).
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Department's instructions enlist the aid of state and local officials to carry out
federal law.2 3 Both programs require the use of, or reference to, federally prepared
or approved sources of information in order for the officials to come to a conclusion
on what action they must take.23 In this way, the federal government not only
directs the officials to act, but also commands which steps each actor must take to
comply with the law. By asserting that state officials are bound under the
Constitution and international law to comply with consular notification obligations,
without offering federal assistance in carrying out these obligations, the Department
compels state and local officials to carry out federal law.
235
There are, of course, several ways in which the State Department's program can
be distinguished from that involved in the Printz case. First, the burden on the states
might fall somewhere between the onerous Brady Act requirements and the
"ministerial reporting requirements" that the concurring Justice O'Connor felt were
not declared invalid under Printz.236 Second, the State Department's program may
not be an official "directive," but may instead be merely a command that states
"consider" federal standards, like the federal regulations that were approved in
FERC v. Mississippi,231 and affirmed in Printz. 2 8 Third, the promulgation of the
233. Although the State Department's program is couched in permissive terms, without a federal program
in place to monitor alien arrests and detentions and notify consulates, the duty to carry out obligations under the
treaty necessarily must fall upon the states.
234. In Printz4 the chief law enforcement officers (CLEO) ofindividual states were required to do "research
in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system designated by the
Attorney General." Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 903 (1997); see also id. (discussing the actions CLEO's
must take to comply with the Brady Act). Under the State Department Consular Notification Access program,
officials seeking to comply with the treaty will, in most cases, need to refer to some source of information
concerning the United States' treaty obligations if the official wishes to ensure that he or she is in full compliance
with the obligation. Currently the information needed by a state official is contained in the State Department
Publication. See generally CONSULAR ACCESS PUBLICATION, supra note 27,passim (setting forth the requirements
to be followed if the United States' consular notification obligations are to be met).
235. Cf supra note 227-30 and accompanying text (detailing the legal basis that the State Department has
offered for its instructions).
236. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (pointing out that the Court "refrain[ed] from
deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local
authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid"); id (O'Connor, J. concurring) (citing
a federal law requiring state and local authorities to report missing children to the Department of Justice as an
example of a program not declared invalid).
237. 456 U.S. 742 (1982); see id at 765 (approving a federal program which "simply condition[ed]
continued state involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration of federal proposals').
238. Whether the State Department's "instructions" amount to a directive, or a request that states consider
federal law, is an arguable point. The "instructions" suggest that the Convention "should be followed by all
federal, state, and local government officials, whether law enforcement, judicial, or other, insofar as they pertain
to foreign nationals subject to such officials' authority or to matters within such officials' competence." State
Department CONSULAR ACCESS PUBLICATION, supra note 27, at 1. The publication then cites the Supremacy
Clause and case law as authority for why the aforementioned officials should comply with the Convention. Id
at 13; see also id at 19 (answering the hypothetical question "[wihy are state and local government officials
expected to provide such notification?" with the answer that the officials must comply because the "obligations
are embodied in treaties that are the law of the land under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution").
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State Department's program may be considered an exercise of the Executive's
authority to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" 9 rather than an
exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper Clause powers.24°
However, these distinctions are shallow ones that only serve to shift the focus from
the real issue: whether the delegation of broad authority to the federal government
in the area of foreign affairs also implies the right of the government to compel
state actors to carry out international duties.
E. Does the Commandeering Immunity Extend to Foreign Affairs?
Consider Missouri v. Holland24' for a moment. There, the government had
enacted laws protecting migratory birds pursuant to a treaty enacted between the
United States and Great Britain.242 This treaty was only enacted after similar
domestic legislation had been declared unconstitutional when defended only on
Commerce Clause grounds.243 This consideration begs a question-would the Brady
Act's interim provisions be valid if they had been enacted pursuant to a treaty,
instead of pursuant to Congress' Commerce Clause Power? Or, would the Holland
Court have reached the same conclusion if the Migratory Bird Treaty Act had relied
on state game wardens to enforce its provisions instead of federal wardens? These
are the questions posed by the Vienna Convention requirements. The question is
whether the federal government may rely on state officials to administer Article 36
of the Convention.
If the Court considers this question, it will be making one ultimate decision-it
will decide whether the attribute of state sovereignty found in New York v. United
States244 and Printz v. United States245 extends to the area of foreign affairs. Under
New York, the immunity exists due to the method by which the government itself
must function-the federal government must act upon individuals, not states.246
Therefore, this attribute of sovereignty would seem to have only structural
239. U.S. CoNsT. arL Hn, § 3.
240. This distinction is especially shaky given that the gist of New York and Printz was that the federal
government could not conscript state legislatures or actors without emphasizing whether the legislative or
executive branch of the government was doing the conscripting. Additionally, dicta in Printz may actually
strengthen a case for unconstitutionality by pointing out that delegating responsibility for the implementation of
a federal program to the states directly removes executive control over the federal program. See Printz, 521 U.S.
at 922 (questioning implicitly whether "meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint
and remove").
241. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
242. Id. at 431.
243. Id. at 432.
244. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text (setting forth the Supreme
Court's reasoning regarding state sovereignty in the New York case).
245. 521 U.S. 898 (1997); see supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text (presenting the main reason for
the Court's holding in the Printz case).
246. See supra notes 193-203 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of New York).
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boundaries as opposed to boundaries based on which enumerated power of the
federal government the Court was considering.2 7 However, to find that the
immunity does extend to foreign affairs would require rejection of the reasoning of
the Court in its United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.4m decision.249 In
Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court reasoned that the states had never possessed any
attributes of sovereignty with respect to foreign affairs.0s To find now that the
states do retain an attribute of sovereignty-freedom from federal commandeering
of the state's officials-and that this attribute extends to the area of foreign affairs,
would necessarily infringe upon the reasoning of Curtiss-Wright.
However, this author believes concluding that federal reliance on the states to
implement the nation's consular notification duties is an unconstitutional
commandeering of states officials would be incorrect. First, the State Department's
program is not designed simply to meet the "crisis of the day."' ' Instead, the ability
of nations to assist their nationals when detained or arrested in foreign countries is
time-honored, customary international law, which must be followed by all
nations. s2 In the United States, not every arrest or detention occurs at the hands of
the federal government .25 Therefore, as long as the states have the power to arrest
or detain foreign nationals, the states must comply with international rules
regarding the proper procedure to follow when arresting those nationals.2 Thus,
even if the states are not "mere political subdivisions of the United States, and
are instead to be considered a sovereign branch of a dualist government, 2 6 they
must comply with the same rules to which all other sovereigns are bound.257
247. These structural boundaries would necessarily be broader than powers based on an enumerated power
because they encompass the operation of the national government itself, instead of the powers of the government.
Cf. supra Part ffI.C (discussing the reasoning of New York and Printz).
248. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
249. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text (evaluating the reasoning of Curtiss-Wright).
250. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text (same).
251. New York, 505 U.S. at 187; see itt (discussing the necessity of the division of power between state and
federal governments to ensure that power is not excessively concentrated in either sovereign simply to solve the
current political crisis); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 932-33 (reaffirming the above-mentioned proposition from
New York).
252. See supra Part II.A-B (discussing the history and legal basis for consular assistance).
253. Many arrests, obviously, are made by state and local officials.
254. See supra Part UI.B (outlining the legal basis for broad federal foreign affairs powers). But see Bradley
& Goldsmith, supra note 145, at 679 (arguing that despite the "conventional wisdom" that the national foreign
affairs power overrides competing state concerns, "foreign relations concerns are but one component of the
national interest to be weighed against, and sometimes overriden by, other concerns").
255. New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
256. See supra Part II.C (discussing the federalist structure of the government as explained by the Supreme
Court in recent cases).
257. See supra Part II.A-B (discussing the United States' consular notification obligations arising from its
many consular agreements); see also CONSULAR ACCESS PUBLICATION, supra note 27, at 44 (noting that consular
notification obligations may also be customary international law which would theoretically bind all sovereign
nations regardless of whether or not they are party to an international agreement embodying the obligation).
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It is also premature to conclude that Printz and New York set down a bright-line
rule that could be transplanted into the area of foreign relations. The nature of the
current Supreme Court's analysis is not one of line-drawing. 1 8 Instead, the Court
attempts to give the Constitution the proper application in each case by utilizing
only subtle extensions or retractions of the law where necessary.259 The current
Court also has a great respect for precedent. 260 As discussed above, vast precedent
exists which supports the proposition that national foreign policy must prevail over
inconsistent state law or policy.26' Extending this immunity into matters involving
foreign affairs would require undermining that precedent.
Only the Court can decide whether to extend the newly devised
"commandeering" immunity to the area of foreign affairs. Both the broad foreign
affairs power and state immunity from federal commandeering have formidable
historical support,262 and both are implied in the structure and text of the
Constitution itself.263 Both also have precedential support.2- 4 Perhaps this dilemma
is one of the reasons the Court has not felt inclined to open the debate on the issue
of state violations of the Vienna Convention thus far.
258. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 9-11 (1999) (arguing that the analytical heart of the current Court-comprised of Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter--tries to avoid broad rulings, and instead prefers to decide cases
narrowly based on the specific facts at hand); 1 CHARLESD. KELSO, MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12-17
(1998) (not formally published) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the decision-making style
of Supreme Court jurists).
259. See generally KELSO, supra note 258, at x-xiii (explaining the constitutional decision-making policy
that seems to guide each member of the current Court to account for why the Court decides cases narrowly),
260. See id. at xi-xii, 13-14 (proposing that five modem Jurists-Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor,
and Souter-are natural law justices, whose decision making style is characterized by, among other things, respect
for precedent).
261. See supra Part Il.B (explaining the development of the federal government's broad foreign affairs
powers). For a historical and legal perspective of the broad federal foreign affairs powers, see Hauenstein v.
Lynham, 100 U.S. 483,488-89 (1879) (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), for the proposition
that "[a] treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land... if any act of a State legislature can stand in its way");
id. at 489 (commenting that although the Court may not concur entirely with the Ware opinion, the Court does
believe that opinion shows "the views of a powerful legal mind ... when the debates in the convention which
framed the Constitution must have been fresh in the memory of the leading jurists of the country").
262. Compare, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-69 (1941) (presenting historical evidence
supporting the "supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs"), with New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-59 (1992) (offering historical evidence in support of the theory that federal laws were
to affect individuals, not states).
263. Compare supra Part M.B and accompanying text (discussing the origin of the federal foreign affairs
powers), with New York, 505 U.S. at 155-59 (analyzing the constitutional structure of the United States
government).
264. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936).
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IV. A PROPOSED METHOD FOR ENFORCING ARTICLE 36 WITHIN THE STATES
Because of the importance of consular notification in international affairs,
Congress should not wait for this area of law to develop on a case-by-case basis.
The seriousness with which nations take their consular notification rights is
illustrated by the fact that two nations, Paraguay and Germany, have brought
actions against the United States in the International Court of Justice for violations
of Article 36.26' Although Paraguay subsequently dropped its action, the same is not
likely to happen with Germany, because at least three German nationals are
currently on death row awaiting execution. 26 Furthermore, a policy of merely
advising the states of the government's obligations under the Convention, with no
other method for assuring other nations that the United States is attempting to
comply with the treaty, may not gain international acceptance. 267 With only this
procedure in place, the United States' frequent apologies for violations of the
Convention must seem to other countries to be shallow.26 Stricter legal measures
may help remedy this international concern.
Two limits must be considered when fashioning any plan for the Convention's
enforcement. The first is a politically practical consideration. Legislation granting
too-severe rights to criminal defendants would simply not pass in Congress.
Therefore, a per se exclusionary rule for evidence gained in violation of the
Convention is unrealistic. 269 The second consideration is the constitutional one, and
is the focus of this Comment. Legislation that would utilize law enforcement
officials directly, or require legislatures or state executives to implement procedures
to comply with the treaty, would meet head-on with the immunity developed in
Printz v. United States27 0 and New York v. United States.271 Although this legislation
may be the ideal way to resolve the question discussed in this Comment, it also
seems unlikely that Congress, or the courts, would add a Miranda-like requirement
265. See supra note 12 (citing the cases brought by Germany and Paraguay in the International Court of
Justice).
266. See Shaffer, supra note 13, at Al (noting that two other German brothers, Rudi and Michael Apelt, are
also on death row in Arizona, and another German is on death row in Florida); see also Warren, supra note 16,
at 3 (listing the Apelt brothers' execution date as "June 1999").
267. This may be especially true if the number of violations continues to grow.
268. Cf. Mary Beth Warner & Jerry Kramer, Germans Knock U.S. Justice: Media, Citizens Decry Death as
Form of Punishment, Criticize Hull, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 4, 1999, at A2, available in 1999 WL 4155717
(reporting that German "government officials were lamenting the fact that the United States was about to conduct
another execution even as Secretary of State Madelaine Albright was in China, complaining of human rights
violations there"); icl (describing the concern of German citizens that Governor Hull was "acting for purely
political motives, to show how tough she is").
269. For example, one district court refused to utilize the exclusionary rule, stating that treaty rights are
important, but "should not be cloaked with the 'nontextual and unprecedented remedy."' United States v. $69,530
in United States Currency, 22 F. Supp.2d 593, 595 (W.D. Tex. 1998); see id. (refusing to utilize the exclusionary
rule in a civil forfeiture case arising out of a possible Vienna Convention violation).
270. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
271. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see supra Part II.C (discussing the commandeering immunity).
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to the current Miranda requirements that are already so widely criticized.2 7 A
Miranda-like requirement would have an additional practical difficulty: It would
necessitate the advising and training of the nation's vast corps of law enforcement
officials regarding the rights and remedies of the Vienna Convention.
However, a viable compromise exists that will take consideration of both the
rights of other nations and the political and legal considerations of the United
States.273 This compromise would utilize state and federal courts to ensure Article
36 compliance within the states. Legislation can be enacted which would require
both federal and state courts to ascertain at every defendant's initial hearing
whether the defendant is a foreign national, and, if so, whether the national was
informed of Article 36 rights.2 74 The format of the notification could parallel the
advisement of rights typically given to criminal defendants.275 All defendants would
be asked at their initial appearance whether they are a national of a foreign country.
The court would then take measures to ensure that foreign defendants are properly
advised of their consular notification rights.276
272. See generally RICHARD A.LEo &GEORGEC. THoMAs III, THEMIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUsTICE, AND
POLICING (1998) (compiling an array of articles and essays on the Miranda warnings).
273. Both New York and Printz recognized other methods by which the federal government may
constitutionally compel state action. Congress can condition the state's receipt of federal funds upon compliance
with certain requirements, so long as the requirements bear a relationship with the funds. New York, 505 at 167.
Congress may also "offer States the choice between regulating... according to federal standards or having state
law pre-empted by federal regulation." Id.; see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997) (affirming this
proposition). Finally, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, "federal law is enforceable in state courts
and [the] federal courts may in proper circumstances order state officials to comply with federal law. .. ." New
York, 505 U.S. 179; Printz, 521 U.S. at 898-99 (recognizing that "the Constitution was originally understood to
permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions"). But see id. at 907 (clarifying
that "early statutes imposing obligations on state courts [do not] imply a power of Congress to impress the state
executive into its service").
274. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,433-35 (1920) (holding that Congress has the power, under the
necessary and proper clause, to enact legislation pursuant to a treaty); see also TRIBE, supra note 29, § 4-5, 227
(discussing the ability of Congress to enact legislation pursuant to a treaty). Cf. Warren, supra note 16, at "Full
Compliance in New Jersey?" (reporting that New Jersey is implementing a plan to inform foreign nationals of their
rights at the first initial hearing).
275. See, e.g., FED. R CRIM. P. 5(c), 58 (mandating that defendants be advised of certain rights, such as the
right to counsel and the right not to incriminate oneself, at the defendant's initial appearance before a magistrate);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) (requiring that persons arrested be brought "without unnecessary delay" before a magistrate
for an initial appearance).
276. A sample procedure could be: First, the court would ask the defendant whether he or she is a foreign
national. The national would then be asked what country he or she is from and whether he or she has been
informed of his or her right to contact his or her nation's consul. If he or she has not, the court shall ascertain
whether the nation is a mandatory or permissive notification nation. The court shall then order the prosecutor to
inform the defendant or the defendant's counsel of the defendant's consular notification rights and shall direct the
prosecutor to notify the defendant's consulate if the defendant so chooses or if such notification is mandatory. To
make compliance with these duties less cumbersome upon the courts, the federal government could undertake the
duty to maintain a database of phone numbers and locations of embassies and consular officers, and provide the
same to courts in writing yearly, or as otherwise required.
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Using the courts to enforce Article 36 in the states has several benefits. Perhaps
the strongest benefit is that such use is presumably constitutional. 7  First,
constitutional authority for the imposition of federal law upon state judges is found
in the Supremacy Clause, which mandates that "the Judges in every State shall be
bound [by the laws of the United States]."2 78 Additionally, in Printz v. United
States,279 the Court recognized the principle that the "Constitution was originally
understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal
prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the
judicial power." 0 The Court explained that federal imposition on state courts was
understandable because courts apply "the law of other sovereigns all the time."'
Under this reasoning, advising criminal defendants of their legal rights is a power
that is profoundly appropriate for the judicial branch.
There are also several practical reasons why using the courts to enforce Article
36 would be superior to relying on law enforcement officials. First, advising the
judiciary, as opposed to all states' law enforcement bureaucracies, of the
requirements of the Vienna Convention would be more technically manageable.282
Second, explicitly delegating the duty to one branch of the justice system, to be
enforced at a specific time in the justice process, is likely to promote consistency
in the notification process. Third, implementing concrete laws addressing the
nation's notification duties may make the United States' apologies for violations
of the Convention more acceptable to other countries, if the nation can show that
it is making a good-faith effort to comply with the Convention. Finally, the
possibility of courts excluding evidence because of Vienna Convention violations
will undoubtedly encourage some law enforcement agencies, or perhaps state
legislatures, to implement procedures for ensuring compliance with Article 36.
277. See infra notes 278-81 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court has held that federal
laws are enforceable in state courts).
278. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 (explaining that "[t]he principle underlying
[the] so-called 'transitory' causes of action [which state judges must enforce under the Supremacy Clause] was
that laws which operated elsewhere created obligations in justice that courts of the forum state would enforce").
279. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
280. Id at 907; see id at 928-29 (reaffirming the holding in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), that federal
laws are enforceable in state courts).
281. Id at 907.
282. Obviously, there are far fewer judges than law enforcement officials, and the judges presumably will
understand and adhere to their constitutional duties.
283. This possibility assumes that law enforcement agencies would be more likely to implement notification
procedures if a clear legal duty to enforce the Convention exists, with remedies for departure from that duty.
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Under this plan, two types of Article 36 claims might arise.2" The first involves
claims that an individual national's right of notification was violated because he or
she was not notified of the right "without delay," as is required by the
Convention.m In these cases, nationals would be arguing that notification must be
given immediately, by law enforcement officials, instead of a few days later at the
initial hearing. While these claims should be allowed, the burden should fall upon
the national to raise and prove them. 286 If in fact a human rights or legal rights
violation did occur during this period, then the national's claim should prevail, and
his or her Convention rights would be given full effect.2e
The second type of claim could arise when notification is not given at the
initial hearing, after the implementation of the initial hearing rule.288 In these cases,
if the national claims that prejudice resulted because of a lack of notification, the
burden should fail on the government to prove that the failure to notify did not
prejudice the defendant. The reason for shifting the burden in these cases is clear.
Devising a plan whereby the court notifies the national is simply a safeguard to
ensure compliance with the treaty, although jurists could order any state officials
in their jurisdiction to give notification earlier. However, if the law enforcement
official, prosecutor, and court each fail to notify the national of his or her rights, the
284. A third type of claim would be based upon notification breaches that occurred before this law would
be implemented, such as the claims raised by Faulder, Breard, and LaGrand. See supra notes 7-15 and
accompanying text (summarizing the Faulder, Breard, and LaGrand situations). Discussing the problems that result
from granting remedies for violations that occurred long ago is outside the scope of this Comment, but may truly
be a diplomatic, rather than a legal, problem, as the Supreme Court suggested in Breard. See Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371,378 (1998) (noting in dicta that no case allows the Supreme Court to force the Governor of Virginia
to wait for the decision of the International Court of Justice in Breard's case, because the Court thought that
whether to wait for the decision or not was essentially a diplomatic decision). However, when involved in
diplomatic discussions regarding prior violations of the Convention, the ability of American diplomats to point
to solid efforts to prevent new violations of the Convention from occurring may ease international concerns that
the United States is not doing enough to ensure compliance with its international obligations. See infra notes 289-
91 and accompanying text (discussing the international outcry over the United States' handling of consular
notification cases).
285. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 36. The precise meaning of the words "without delay" is
unclear. The United States, while protesting Convention violations that have resulted in notification not having
been given to Americans detained for 28 or 32 hours in other countries, does advise its consular officers that they
are not to act as attorneys or assume legal responsibility for the nationals. LEE, supra note 25, at 148-49. They are,
however, to ensure that no violations of human and legal rights occur. Id. at 148 (quoting the testimony of a
Department of State administrator advising a House Committee about the duties of consular officers).
286. Placing the burden on the defendant to allege and prove these claims would be consistent with the
prevailing prejudice analysis used by the courts, which places the burden on the defendant. See supra notes 108-15
and accompanying text (discussing the use of a prejudice analysis by the courts in consular notification cases).
287. Cf Colorado v. Mata-Medina, No. 97 CR 307, at 4 (Co. Dist. Ct. May 7, 1998) (visited Jan. 7, 1999)
<http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/pdef-dir/Library/Mata-Medina/Antonio%20Mata-Medina%200rder.html>
(suggesting that a court must examine the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether or not to suppress
evidence gained via a Vienna Convention violation). Although Mata-Medina obviously did not arise under the
program suggested in this section, presumably human rights violations, or violations of other legal rights, would
factor heavily in the defendant's favor during any totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
288. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text (suggesting that foreign nationals be advised of their
Article 36 rights at their initial appearances).
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effect of the legislation is nullified. To prevent this, a higher burden should be
placed on the government when the national is not notified at his or her initial
appearance.
V. CONCLUSION
There is growing sentiment in the international arena that, as the world's only
superpower, the United States is acting as if it were above international law.2 9 It
must confound the nation's allies when, at the same time the nation calls upon them
to support its efforts to maintain international peace and security, the nation holds
that it cannot do more to ensure that foreign nationals receive the full protections
of international law in the nation's courts.290 To truly lead the world toward greater
protection of economic and personal liberties, the United States must lead by
example, not by sheer economic and military might.29'
The United States can set an international example by making a diligent effort
to ensure nationwide compliance with Article 36. This Comment proposes a
workable and simple method of notifying detained foreign nationals of the
availability of consular assistance. Consular notification at a criminal defendant's
initial appearance would meet the demands of the Convention while also alleviating
the legal and practical difficulties of relying on state law enforcement officials to
enforce Article 36. Forward-looking thought in this area could put an end to the
nation's current reliance on backward apologies for its violations of international
law.
289. Cf Many Countries Alienated by Workings of U.S. Courts, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Mar. 7, 1999, at 4B
(detailing several countries' belief that the United States sees itself as being above international law).
290. Cf German Press Slams US Execution of Convicted Killer, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 5, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 2558332 (providing several excerpts from German newspapers chastising the United States'
inconsistent practice with regard to international law). For instance, one newspaper argued that the United States:
'[A]ccepts international law when it serves its own interests. The same goes for its relation with
international organizations. They are used when the cost-benefit relationship seems to be right. They
are shunned-when (the US) needs a free hand....'
Id. (quoting a daily German newspaper, the FrankfurterAilgemeine Zeitung).
291. See Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 458, 462 (1998) (concluding
that "[a] reputation for playing fast and loose with treaty commitments can only do harm to our capacity to be a
leader in the post-Cold War world").

